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Case No. 20080120-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
David Daniel Quintana, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for distribution of a controlled substance 
in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, and possession of a controlled substance in 
a drug-free zone, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUB 
Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case to the jury where the 
evidence was undisputed that defendant stored methamphetamine in his kitchen 
freezer and where the evidence and its fair inferences, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to establish that he sold methamphetamine 
to a confidential informant? 
Standard of Review. To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must 
demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should have been obvious, and 
that, absent the error, he had a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. 
State v. Dunn, 850 R2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count each of 
distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in 
a drug-free zone, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii), and possession or use of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i). R. 42-43. A jury convicted him as charged. R. 54. The court sentenced 
defendant to concurrent prison terms of five years to life on the first degree felony 
and one-to-fifteen years on the second degree felony, with credit for time served. R. 
111-13. Defendant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. R. 115-17. Pursuant to rule 
42(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court poured the case 
over to this Court. R. 123. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Controlled Buy 
On January 27,2006, two officers of the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force arranged with a confidential informant ["CI"] to purchase 
methamphetamine from defendant. The informant, who had a criminal history 
that included convictions for methamphetamine possession, conspiracy to 
commit robbery, and theft, had worked with the officers for several months. R. 
130:126,129,133. Officer Grogan, the case agent, acknowledged the CI's 
criminal history, noting that "the criminal record is part of the package that you 
accept" when working with a CI with connections to the drug trade. R. 131: 50. 
Grogan further testified that the CI had previously "given good information on 
other cases that led to arrests. He'd also done a good job on other cases 
introducing undercover officers to other sources and [he] always followed 
directions." Id. at 51. 
In this case, the CI told the officers he could buy methamphetamine from 
defendant. R. 130:133. Consequently, after searching the CI, providing him with 
two marked $100 bills, wiring him, and setting up surveillance, the officers drove 
the CI to the vicinity of defendant's home. R. 131:53-55. Officers were strategically 
placed to observe defendant from the moment he left the officer's vehicle until he 
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entered defendant's home and from the moment he left the home until he was safely 
back with an officer. R. 130:164-67,190-91; R. 131: 64-66. 
The CI testified that he waited about ten minutes outside the home and then 
was invited inside by defendant and led to a back room. R. 130:138-39. In this 
room, the CI saw a surveillance camera, which was pointed towards the back yard. 
Id. at 140. After arranging to buy an "eightball," or 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, 
the CI and defendant discussed the purchase of larger quantities of 
methamphetamine in the future. Id. at 141,143; R. 131:61. The two men exchanged 
phone numbers. R. 130: 144. Defendant left the room and returned with a box. The 
CI testified, "There was bags or a bag of methamphetamine in it. Weighed it out, 
put it in a bag, and gave it to me after I had handed [defendant] the money." Id. at 
144,146. The CI put the baggie of meth in his pocket and walked out of the house 
and around the corner to an officer's car. Id. at 146. Once in the car, the CI turned 
the baggie over to the officer. Id. at 147. Back at the starting location, officers 
searched the CI and subsequently paid him $100 for successfully completing the 
controlled buy. Id. at 128,147. 
Officer Grogan testified that he began preparing a search warrant after the 
controlled buy was complete. He stated, "The material's fresh on my mind. I know 
4 
what just happened, I can write it down in a search warrant at that time and just 
keep track of it as I go and build the case/7 R. 131: 90. 
Officers Execute the Search Warrant 
Just about two weeks later, on February 10,2006, Officer Grogan received 
a phone call from detectives who were at defendant's home on a different matter. 
R. 130:172; R. 131:90,91. Because those officers were already on the scene and 
wanted to talk with defendant, and because defendant was present in the home 
but not responding to the officers, Grogan decided to get his warrant signed and 
executed. R. 131:90-92; 114. He did so, and the officers entered defendant's 
home on a no-knock warrant. Id. at 92-93. Inside, they found defendant, 
another man, and a woman. Id. at 93. 
In the course of searching the home pursuant to the warrant, an agent 
found a baggie of methamphetamine in the freezer compartment of the 
refrigerator. R. 130:174,195. In the back room, Officer Grogan found 
surveillance equipment, including a camera and monitor. R. 131: 95. The officer 
testified that "it is indicative of individuals that use and sell narcotics to have 
surveillance equipment. Especially in a home where there's not any property, 
there's not a lot of furniture or expensive items." Id. at 96. 
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Based on the methamphetamine that defendant sold to the CI and the 
methamphetamine that the agent found in defendant's freezer, the State charged 
defendant with one count each of distribution of a controlled substance and 
possession of a controlled substance. Both counts were enhanced because 
defendant's home was located within a drug-free zone. R. 42-43. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For defendant to prevail on an unpreserved sufficiency claim raised as 
plain error, he must first demonstrate that the evidence did not suffice to support 
the conviction. He fails to do so. 
First, defendant contends that the confidential informant was not credible 
because he had a criminal record and was paid for his work by the narcotics task 
force. Therefore, he asserts, the evidence was insufficient to support the 
distribution charge. The jury, however, knew the CI's background and 
nonetheless found his testimony credible. Moreover, three police officers 
corroborated the circumstances surrounding the controlled buy. Defendant's 
argument ultimately fails because credibility determinations are left to the jury, 
which is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony. A reviewing court 
will not reweigh the jury's assessments. 
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Second, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict 
him of possession of a controlled substance. Where defendant conceded that 
mefhamphetamine was found in his freezer and where no evidence suggested 
that anyone else either lived in his house or had access to his freezer, the jury 
could reasonably infer that the contents of the freezer belonged to him. No more 
is necessary to defeat a claim of insufficiency of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN SUBMITTING 
THE CASE TO THE JURY WHERE THE EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT SOLD 
METHAMPHETAMINE TO A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT 
AND WHERE IT WAS UNDISPUTED THAT DEFENDANT 
STORED METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS KITCHEN FREEZER 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by submitting the case to the jury 
because the evidence was insufficient to prove either that defendant sold 
mefhamphetamine to a confidential informant or that the mefhamphetamine found 
in his freezer belonged to him. See Br. of Aplt. at 6. 
At the outset, to reverse the trial court's ruling, defendant must marshal the 
evidence. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (explaining marshaling requirement). 
Marshaling requires a defendant to gather and present, in a light most favorable to 
the verdict, "every scrap of competent evidence... which supports the very findings 
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[he] resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 
1991). He must "fully embrac[e] the [State's] position" without "simply rearguing 
and recharacterizing" the evidence. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75,117,124 P.3d 235 
(citations and quotations omitted). Failure to properly marshal the evidence suffices 
to reject a sufficiency claim. See, e.g., Clark, 2005 UT 75, 1 17; State v. Hopkins, 1999 
UT 98,116,989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991). 
While defendant has made some attempt to marshal the evidence supporting 
the second-degree-felony possession charge, he has wholly failed to marshal the 
evidence related to the first-degree-felony distribution charge. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-
11. For this reason alone, the Court should decline to consider his challenge to the 
distribution charge. 
Moreover, because defendant did not preserve the sufficiency issue at trial by 
filing a motion for a directed verdict, he must rely on a plain error argument on 
appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,116,10 P.3d 346 (generally, in order to 
preserve issue for appeal, defendant must raise sufficiency claim by proper motion). 
"[T]o establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury/7 Id. at 117. Only after the defendant convincingly 
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makes an initial showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine 
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain 
error to submit the case to the jury/' Id. at f l8 . 
Defendant's argument fails on both counts. First, defendant argues that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the charge of distribution of a controlled 
substance because the CI offered the "only evidence" to support the charge. 
Defendant contends that the informant's testimony was not credible because he was 
paid by the narcotics task force and had a criminal record. See Br. of Aplt. at 11. 
Defendant recognizes that three police officers also offered evidence, but discounts 
their testimony in its entirety because two of the officers provided inconsistent 
statements about peripheral details—whether the CI had cigarettes or a wallet or 
nothing at all with him at the time of the controlled buy. Id. 
Defendant's argument fails because it relies on an appellate reassessment of 
the witnesses' credibility. The law is well-settled that "determinations of witness 
credibility are left to the jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of 
any witness's testimony." State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968,972 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902,904-05 (Utah App. 1990). 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves 
as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight to be given particular evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court 
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may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve 
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1993)(citations omitted). In this case, the 
jury knew that the informant had a criminal record and that the task force paid him 
for arranging and completing the controlled buy. The jury also knew that 
informants typically have imsavory criminal histories and that this particular 
informant had proven reliable on multiple past occasions. See R. 131:49-51. After 
hearing the informant's testimony, the jury apparently chose to believe him. A 
reviewing court will not revisit this credibility determination on appeal. State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1117 (Utah App. 1995). 
Furthermore, as to the discrepancy in the testimony of the three officers, the 
law is equally well-settled that minor inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness's 
testimony will not warrant reversal based on insufficient evidence. State v. Baker, 
963 P.2d 801,809 (Utah App. 1998). It was well within the prerogative of the jury to 
believe both that one or more of the officers were mistaken about the personal items 
defendant had on his person and that the officers accurately described the 
circumstances surrounding the controlled buy. 
Second, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 
possession of a controlled substance, the charge arising from the execution of the 
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search warrant in February of 2006. Curiously, however, he concedes that "[i]t is 
undisputed that an illegal substance was found in the freezer at [defendant's 
home." Br. of Aplt. at 10. Defendant points to no record evidence that anyone else 
lived in the home or even had access to the freezer. The Utah Supreme Court has 
determined that, especially where occupancy is non-exclusive, courts establish a 
nexus between defendant and drugs by examining factors such as "incriminating 
statements made by the accused," "incriminating behavior of the accused," the 
"presence of drugs in a specific area over which the accused had control," and the 
"presence of drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or in a place 
over which accused has special control." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,319 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). Here, no evidence suggested that defendant's occupancy of the 
home was anything but exclusive. In addition, defendant had surveillance 
equipment in his home and had recently sold drugs to a CI. Together, these facts all 
point to a clear nexus between defendant and the methamphetamine found in his 
freezer. 
Defendant argues that the State failed to establish his nexus to the drugs 
because two other people happened to be in the home at the time the warrant was 
executed. Br. of Aplt. at 10. As to these two individuals, however, the record 
evidence supports only their presence in the front room, where they waited with 
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one officer while other officers executed the search warrant. R. 130: 174. Not a 
shred of evidence suggests they were ever in the kitchen, much less that either of 
them had access to the freezer or owned the drugs found in the freezer. 
Absent any evidence to the contrary, a jury could fairly infer that the person 
who lives in the home possesses whatever might be found in the freezer. See, e.g., 
Goffinet v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)(under theory of 
constructive possession, knowledge of presence of contraband "may be inferred 
from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premise containing the 
contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances 
pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband" (citation 
omitted)); Posey v. State, 736 So.2d 656,658 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)(same); cf. People 
v. Wilkie, 522 P.2d 727, 729 (Colo. 1974)(joint possession of apartment at least 
partially under dominion and control of accused suffices to establish accused's 
possession of drugs found in refrigerator). 
In this case, no record evidence suggests that the other two people who 
happened to be in the home when the officers executed the search warrant either 
lived there or had access to the freezer. Thus, the inference that the drugs found in 
the freezer belonged to defendant is not only a reasonable inference, or even the 
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most reasonable inference; it is the only reasonable inference. No more is necessary 
to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted November /3.2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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